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THE THERAPIST PSYCHOLOGIST BOOK STORE
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The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents By R. Key DismukesBenjamin A. BermanLoukia D. Loukopoulos ( Ashgate Publishing )
Release Date: 2007-01
Average Customer Rating:
List Price: $39.95
Price: $39.15
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Excellent seller ( bbahramb )
Easy transaction, book in condition it was described and received it on time...would buy from seller again.
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A good answer that should continue ( sanchez-alarcos )
When someone reviews statistical information about human factors in air accidents, it is very easy to find that under the label "human factors" there are many different and heterogeneous things.
The real way to know what is the importance of human factors is an in-depth analysis of many accidents without accepting the generic "human factors" as an explanation. That is exactly what authors make with several accidents explaining beyond NTSB analysis why crew behaved in a way that, finally, drove to an accident.
The book shows a model of analysis and that is very useful for investigators or air safety experts in general. However, the application of that kind of analysis to many other accidents -all of them, if possible, instead of a few ones- should be extremely useful not only to avoid new accidents but to design new planes, new SOPs and new training models.
The conclusion we could extract is as follows: At this moment, we are not extracting all the possible knowledge from an accident. The book explains how to go further.
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Breathes life into accident reports ( gudgenby )
The authors have applied insights from cognitive psychology to nineteen flight-crew-related accidents. In place of the dry narratives of accident reports, we are presented with compelling three-dimensional accounts in which pilots are routinely faced with time pressure, the need to make judgments under uncertainty, and rare but potentially lethal system failures. In examining each accident, the authors attempt to reconstruct the mindset of the pilots, and place the actions of the crew in the context of the flow of events. In contrast to other reviews of accidents, the authors avoid the phrase "the pilots should have...". Instead we are gently encouraged to understand how skilled and professional operators can come to make mistakes in circumstances that are unforgiving of error.
Through the lens of cognitive psychology, the aviation industry becomes a massive human performance laboratory, in which hapless operators are faced with situations and problems produced not by experimenters, but by the complexities of the system of which they are a part. The authors take pains to counter the common presumption that catastrophic accidents must somehow result from extreme acts of villainy or incompetence. In this book, we repeatedly see how accidents often arise from combinations of everyday problems and situations.
By the end of the book, some fascinating patterns begin to emerge. A surprising number of the accidents involved apparently simple slips and lapses. Additionally, the majority of accidents occurred on approach and landing, and most of the accident flights were running late. The failure to go-around from an un-stabilized approach is a common theme in the accident scenarios.
On a minor note, a few more illustrations and diagrams would have added some variety to the text, and more extensive quotations from cockpit voice recordings may have helped. Overall however, the book provides a useful compendium of case studies that will be of value to industry and academia. Airline training personnel in particular will find much that is useful in this book.
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An excellent confluence of aviation and psychology ( rahul )
Out of approximately 10 million air carrier flights annually in the US, only about 50 involve a major accident. That may not sound like much, but those accidents consist of events like these: a Continental Airlines flight that landed without its landing gear deployed in Houston; an American Airlines flight that suffered loss of control at 16000 ft.; and another American Airlines flight that hit some trees while attempting to land, the culmination of a series of small, individually insignificant errors. These are some of the examples scrutinized in detail, drawn from a large population of accidents in which human error was a major factor. This book makes fascinating reading - providing pilots and aviation professionals with a new perspective on crew error, and the general public with a new way of looking at the whole aviation system and how safety issues are considered.
The authors dissect these accidents in a way that the airline industry has not attempted in great depth before. Rather than stopping at the facts and a conclusion of "crew error", they ask why highly skilled flight crews, with thousands of hours of flying experience, make mistakes and erroneous judgments with horrifying consequences. The common reaction after an accident is that the crew was not sufficiently skilled, otherwise they would not have made the error. The authors start with a different assumption: they assume that the crew was as good as any other crew that could have been chosen, and from that starting point, their illuminating analyses lead them to consider some very interesting psychological and operational factors that underlie these accidents.
To do this, the authors draw on their expertise on how the human brain works (memory systems and decision-making apparatus) and their complementary expertise on aviation and operations. The authors are all affiliated with NASA; two of the them are research psychologists, one of them was a major investigator with the primary transportation investigative arm of the government, the National Transportation & Safety Board, and all of them have extensive experience with aviation safety.
The book covers 19 accidents, devoting a chapter to each. Two additional chapters at the end provide statistics and a summary of the common themes and factors the authors uncover as contributing to these accidents, along with some prescription of possible countermeasures. When an airplane is involved in an accident, the National Transportation & Safety Board performs thorough investigations - these include interviews with the survivors, forensic evidence, the data from the black box, etc. The investigators produce a report that lays out the facts and their judgment of the causes of the accident.
The studies in this book take these reports as a starting point, and go down paths that the NTSB never ventures (their charter does not permit that). Each of the accident chapters is constructed to provide first a factual recount of the event and the NTSB conclusions. From here the authors identify the most significant events leading up to the accident, and for each event in turn, provide an analysis that mixes operational knowledge with cognitive functioning.
This is not a Michael Crichton thriller, but those familiar with aviation will easily be able to follow the details as they are stated in factual, non-judgmental manner, and will see into the deep causes of the events that led up to the final accident. Readers who are already familiar with aviation terminology will find the book easy to read (do you know what "LOFT" and "windshear" mean?). At the end, the very helpful glossary covers both aviation and cognitive psychology terms so that readers of all levels of industry expertise or interest can enjoy this useful study.
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 The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents ( mfspike )
It reads like a thesis but is full of great analyses beyond the "official" accident reports. Most aircraft accidents are attributed to "pilot error." Here, the authors dissect the human factors in several accidents and delve into human fallibilities and technical traps which make us all prone to error.
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